in Section I that without some modification the standard theory cannot be used to explain how the price of a resource traded by competitive speculators could persistently rise by more than the rate of interest, nor can it be employed to account persuasively for the timing of the observed breaks in the price. In Section II, the standard Hotelling model is extended to the case where risk-neutral agents anticipate an auction of an additional stock at an unknown time. Properties of the anticipations model are established in Section III. The consequences of anticipations of other government policies involving gold sales are considered in Section IV. Section V contains concluding remarks.
I. The Inability of the Standard Model of Exhaustible Resources to Explain the Observed Movements in the Gold Price
To review the simplest model of an extraction industry, suppose a collection of competitive firms with zero extraction costs and fixed stocks of known size sell to consumers whose demand at any time depends only on the price then prevailing in the market. 3 Under such circumstances, only one sequence of prices will make the optimal decisions of extractors and consumers consistent at all times. The equilibrium price path must begin at a specified level and rise at the rate of interest during all periods of positive sales. If the price did not rise at that rate, some prices would have lower discounted values than others. Mine owners maximizing the present value of their profits would sell nothing in those periods, and excess demand would then result. Similarly, if the initial price were set too low (high), the cumulative amount demanded b)y consumers would exceed (fall short of) the cumulative supply, an indication that some of the inteitemporal sequence of markets would fail to clear. When speculators with neither costs of storage nor initial inventories are added to this model, the equilibrium price path does not change. Extraction in a period where speculators buy (sell) exceeds (falls short of) gold consumption, the difference going into (coming from) speculative inventories. While competitive extractors make profits because of the rents on the scarce resource they own, competitive speculators make no profits.
In this simple form, the exhaustible-resource model fails to capture the most salient characteristics of the price path of gold since 1968. It does not predict persistent increases in the price at greater than the rate of interest, nor can it explain either the existence or timing of most drops in the price.4 3Consumers, who purchase goods and services produced using gold, ultimately determine how much gold is bought by jewelry fabricators, dentists, and electronics firms. It is these derived demands which add up to the flow demand curve. Gold used for these purposes is assumed not to be used again, either because of the taboos of society or because of prohibitive costs of recovery.
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However, since the assumptions of this naive model do not reflect several prominent features of the gold market, the omission of some important characteristic may account for the poor predictive performance of the model. Three characteristics of gold distinguish it from the exhaustible resource of the simple model. First, extraction costs in the gold industry are not negligible and have risen. Second, the gold market is not competitive but is dominated by one seller, the South African Reserve Bank.5 Third, gold holders cannot know with certainty the size of the stock which will be available for private use since the possibility always exists that governments may sell to the private market some of their enormous holdings.
Of these three distinguishing features of the gold market,6 only the third could account for the basic characteristics of the observed gold price path. For, while the presence of soaring extraction costs or of monopolistic behavior could conceivably give rise to the observed pattern of prices in 5 The Reserve Bank acquires and markets all South African production, an amount equal to three-quarters of the world total. This arrangement creates a presumption that the Reserve Bank takes account of its influence on market price as Machlup (1969) speculated. Since, in 1970 and 1971, the bank sold part of its supply to the IMF and some central banks in order to avoid reducing the higher price on the free market, the inference that it considers its market power in its sales decisions seems inescapable. The prices the Reserve Bank received from the two different sets of buyers may be used to infer the bank's estimate of the elasticity of the demand for gold at the time. In both 1970 and 1971, South Africa sold gold to the IMF and some central banks at $35 an ounce and to the free market at the higher market price of $40. Such behavior implies that South Africa estimated the marginal revenue of selling another unit on the private market to be $35 or, equivalently, estimated the elasticity of the (excess) demand facing it to be about 8. To infer the elasticity of aggregate demand from this information requires an additional assumption about how South Africa perceived its dominant position in the gold market. If it did not take into consideration how other sellers would react to changes in its sales (the "Cournot" assumption), the elasticity of aggregate demand would simply equal the elasticity of excess demand, estimated above, multiplied by South Africa's market share at the time. If it considered that other extractors would sell more when it sold less (the "Stackelberg" assumption), the implied elasticity of aggregate demand would be lower. For models of a dominant resource extractor which utilize the "Cournot" and the "Stackelberg" solution concepts, see Salant 1976 and 1978, respectively. 6 There may be a fourth characteristic of gold which distinguishes it from the exhaustible resource of the simple model. In the simple model speculators and zero-cost extractors are willing to hold the existing stock of gold only if its price is increasing at the rate of interest. However, it has been suggested that some people may derive services from the mere presence of bullion. Such individuals would be willing to rent gold from its owners in order to obtain these services. As long as gold owners receive a positive rental income, the rate of increase in the gold price sufficient to induce them to hold title to the gold stock would be even smaller than the rate of interest. (In fact, industrial depletion may eventually be choked off altogether, and owners of the remaining stock would then earn only a rental income.) Hence, although the introduction of a demand for services derived from the presence of gold would increase the realism and complexity of the model, it would contribute nothing to an explanation of the observed, rapid surges in the price. An analysis of the effects of introducing a demand for services derived from the stock of an exhaustible resource into the simple model is available on request. the absence of speculators, 7 neither factor could explain the observed pattern in a world where competitive speculators can enter and do operate. Since competitive gold speculators have no extraction costs and negligible storage costs, they prevent the price from persistently rising in percentage terms faster than the rate of interest. For, if speculators came to foresee a more rapid increase, they would attempt to make unlimited profits by borrowing, buying gold in one period, and selling it in the next-thereby carrying cheaper ore into a period in which it would have been more expensive. Such actions would cause the price path to change until all foreseeable opportunities for profitable arbitrage were eliminated.
II. An Alternative Model to Explain Gold Price Movements
Since competitive speculators place an upper bound on the rate of increase of the gold price under the circumstances considered so far, a model which purports to explain movements in these prices must explain why speculators did not flood the gold market when persistently faced with apparently unexploited profit opportunities. We believe the key ingredient in such an explanation is the persistent anticipation of gold holders that a portion of the large stocks held by the world's governments would be sold on the private market at an unpredictable time. This possibility had been mentioned repeatedly in trade journals, official statements, and newspapers long before the U.S. government finally announced its first gold auction. Lewis (1976) indicate that an unconstrained monopolistic extractor might set a price path rising faster than the rate of interest, Salant (1976) and Stiglitz (1976) show that such paths cannot characterize an equilibrium in the presence of speculators. The constraints imposed on a monopolist by competitive speculators are completely analogous to those considered by Smithies (1941) . He considered the single producer of a commodity who wishes to sell it in spatially separated markets at different prices but who knows he cannot (because of arbitrageurs) let prices diverge between markets by more than transportation costs. In an intertemporal model the markets are separated in time, and the cost of transporting through time is the rate of interest.
8 For example, Samuel Montagu & Co., Ltd. cautioned, "Serious consideration has therefore also been given to sales of gold by monetary authorities, and these cannot be excluded in the future" (1973, p. 12). A year later, the warning was renewed that "the very large gold holdings of investors and central banks cannot be ignored" (1974, p. 13). What makes the modified model different is the possibility of government gold sales. To treat the simplest case, we assume a known amount (G) may be sold in a single auction at an unknown date.' Mine owners and speculators are assumed to assess the odds of a sale in the next period,1" given that none has so far been announced, as some constant a." Let P, be the price which will emerge at time t in the absence of an auction and ft be the real price which will result if the auction occurs. Since agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, they act to maximize discounted expected profits. The stock of gold in private hands at the beginning of period t in the absence of an auction is denoted St.
Under these assumptions, five conditions determine the equilibrium paths of the variables in the model. In the initial period the private sector has what gold is in the mines:
( 1) 9 The extension to the case of anticipations of multiple auctions announced at random times is available on request. 10 The simplifying assumption that market participants regard the timing of government gold sales as an entirely exogenous random process implies that agents cannot use market variables (like price) to improve their forecasts of government behavior. Although this assumption eliminates interesting considerations of game theory-which may well be relevant in the future-we think that market participants have had no reasonable basis for believing that government sales decisions to date were related to market behavior. For a not dissimilar view, see Wolfe (1977, p. 35) .
'" Alternatively, agents might have reasons to believe that the probability of an auction at t, given none has occurred before then, will vary over time. This complication can be incorporated merely by adding a time subscript to a in eq. (4). If this alternate specification implies that an auction will occur "soon enough" with probability one, the market would fully discount the event and the stock overhang would not have the effects described in the text. This point has occasionally been adduced as an objection to our analysis. We believe it to be valid as a logical possibility but demonstrably false as an empirical proposition. That is, as long as the market anticipates with probability one that the government will sell its stock some time before the date when I units would be depleted along a path rising at the rate of interest and generating cumulative demand of G + I, then the auction would occur soon enough, and the uncertainty about the exact timing of the auction would not matter. In such a situation, however, the announcement of an auction would not affect the price since the market would already have discounted the event that it would receive the stock in sufficient time. In reality, however, the announcement of each auction has triggered precipitous price declines. This indicates that the market did not fully discount such announcements before they occurred. Therefore, the overhang should have the effects described in the text. Equation (3) determines the potential auction price as an implicit function of the stock remaining in private hands at the time of the auction. Since consumers demand gold in every period before T, mine owners and speculators must be willing both to sell gold and to carry some inventory of the metal. Risk-neutral private gold holders will be indifferent between these two activities only when they yield the same discounted expected profit. Opportunities for profitable arbitrage exist unless the price in period t is equal to the discounted value of the price then expected to prevail in period t + 1: 12 Pt = 1f'+ + (1 -a)Ptfl (arbitrage equation).
(1 + r)
The private stock is depleted between period t and period t + 1 by the amount of nonrecoverable consumption in period t:
1 2 Eq. (4) indicates that the discounted price expected in period t to prevail one period in the future is equal to the price in period t. It can be verified that a similar relation holds for the price expected in period t to prevail k periods in the future. That is, E(Xt+kIPt) To show that equations (1) through (5) determine these variables a backward solution is utilized. At the end, the private stock (ST) and the price (PT) in the absence of an anticipated auction are indicated by the terminal conditions. Using the private stock and equation (3), fT the price that would occur in the final period if there were an auction-can be calculated. Substituting PT and fT into equation (4) yields PT-1, the price that must prevail at the beginning of the previous period in the absence of an auction. The stock in private hands in the previous period can then be determined from equation (5).
It has been shown that starting with the final values of the private stock (ST) and price (PT) in the absence of an auction, values for those same two variables one period earlier can be obtained. The process can be repeated to construct the time paths of the endogenous variables. Eventually, the private stock reaches the level specified by the initial condition, 13 and the backward iteration is terminated; T is calculated by counting the number of backward steps required for termination." 13 If the procedure described in the text is followed, the private stock may never build up exactly to the initial inventory since the analysis of the text is in discrete rather than continuous time. Formally, the arbitrage eq. (4) linking the price at T -1 to the expected price at T holds with an inequality rather than equality because zero stock is carried into period T. Thus, PT-1 E {[LCfT + (1 -z)PJ/[1 + r], PC}. To insure that cumulative demand builds up exactly to the initial inventory, set PT-, at the lower end of this interval and work backward in the manner described in the text, stopping in the first period in which cumulative demand exceeds I. Then increase PT -I until cumulative demand over the same number of periods is reduced exactly to I. That this can be accomplished for PT-J less than the upper limit of the interval is a consequence of the following observation: cumulative demand along a path of a given length beginning with PT-1 at the upper end of the interval is identical with cumulative demand along a path one period shorter beginning with PT-1 at the lower end of the interval. Since, by assumption, demand along the latter path was found to be smaller than I, raising PT-1 to the upper end of the interval and working back one period more will reduce cumulative demand too much. Since cumulative demand over a given number of periods is a continuous function of PT _ 1, there exists some PT -1 in the closed interval above for which cumulative demand exactly matches the initial stock.
14 It might be assumed that gold holders are uncertain about the amount of gold the government might sell but that the distribution of possible auction sizes is independent of the time of the auction and the size of the private stock. Under these assumptions the solution technique is only slightly different. The most striking property of the anticipations model is that, prior to the auction, the price must rise in percentage terms by more than the rate of interest and at an increasing rate. Risk-neutral extractors and speculators require this rate of return to induce them to hold gold in the face of the asymmetric risk of a price collapse which would result if the government announced a sale. According to the arbitrage equation, the expected price in t + 1 must have the same discounted value as the price in period t. Given the intuitive proposition that a government auction in any period would reduce the price (ft < Pt, for all t),' 5 the price which would occur in period t + 1 in the absence of the government sale must have a larger discounted value than the price prevailing in the previous period:
Pt(l + r) = xft+l + (1 -x)Pt+1 < cPt+1 + (1 -a)Pt+1 = Pt+,,
If the price were ever to rise at a slower rate prior to the auction, the expected discounted capital gain from owning gold would be negative, and no one would be willing to hold it as an asset. Since it has been shown that the actual price prior to the auction rises by more than the rate of interest and since it is being supposed for the moment that the potential auction price rises by less than the rate of interest, the ratio (ft+ I /P,) in the expression above must decline over time. Hence, R, increases over time. From equation (7), it also is evident that there is an It has been shown that market participants who are risk-neutral require the gold price to rise by more than the interest rate in order for them to hold gold in the face of the possible capital loss. If holders of gold were averse to risk and therefore preferred a safe return to a risky one with the same expected value, the return to gold holders would have to include a risk premium. In that case, the rise of the gold price would have to be even steeper, and Rt could exceed the upper bound given by (8).
To show that the p -ential auction price rises by less than the rate of An important consequence of this result is that the longer the government waits to auction its gold, the smaller the real discounted value of its proceeds. The exact magnitude of the loss cannot be determined without knowledge of the demand curve and various exogenous magnitudes. However, a lower bound to the loss can be deduced without such information under fairly general assumptions as shown in the Appendix.
The three paths in figure 2 illustrate what has been learned so far about the effects of the anticipation of government sales when gold holders are risk-neutral. Path AA is the path of prices which would emerge with no possibility of government selling. Along this path, price rises at the rate of interest. Since the natural logarithm of price is plotted against time, this path is represented by a straight line. Path BB is the path that emerges in the continued anticipation of sales which have notyet occurred. The slope of BB is always greater than the slope of AA, and rises as time passes. Path CC shows the path of the natural logarithm off, the price which would potentially emerge each period if the government auctioned its stock in that period. It rises at a rate which is always below the rate of interest. Prior to the auction, the gold price moves along BB. If the auction occurs, the price jumps to CC and rises from it along a line parallel to AA. In figure 2 , the price path with risk (BB) begins lower, cuts the no-risk path (AA), and chokes demand sooner. To understand why this is so, recall that since the same stock (I) must be depleted along both paths, cumulative demand along each path must be the same. Suppose the two paths began together. Since prices on the path with risk rise at a faster rate, this path would remain above the other and less would be consumed along it in each period. For the cumulative demand along each path to match, the price path with risk must begin lower. This implies that private gold stocks will be exhausted more quickly than they would be without the risk of government selling which fails to materialize.
That the price path with a risk of government sales should start lower and rise more steeply is intuitively appealing. Suppose society had a fixed stock of some exhaustible resource and had some chance, each period, of discovering a single additional deposit of known size. In that case, depleting more of the fixed stock in the early period than if there were no prospect of finding the additional amount would be sensible. However, if the additional stock were not "found," what remained after the early phase of rapid depletion should be rationed tightly. A group of competitive mine owners and speculators, acting in self-interest, would solve this planning problem by selling at low prices in early periods and very high prices later. Of course, in the case of government sales of gold, the "problem" solved by the market is artificial and man made; however, that makes the risk that additional supplies will topple the price no less real to private holders of gold.
It The current discounted revenue which a mine owner or speculator can expect from the sale of a given amount of gold at any time in the future is equal to its current market value. When the odds of government sales increase, the market value of the existing stock falls. This serves to remind us that while the better prospect of additional supplies is socially beneficial the increased likelihood does injure owners of the existing stock. A country like South Africa, for example, would be injured by actions or announcements of world governments which substantially depress the gold pricejust as it has benefitted substantially from previous international payments arrangements among nations which, in effect, constituted a commodity support program for gold. 16 Suppose instead that the price path were initially higher after Ot increased. Then, as will be argued, eqq. (3) through (5) imply this path would have to remain higher until the choke price is reached. But then cumulative demand along the path with increased risk would be smaller than the initial stock, and excess supply would result. Hence, the path with increased risk must begin strictly below the other path, as is asserted in the text. Specifically, eqq. (3) through (5) imply that the path with increased risk must remain above the other path if it begins higher. From (7), the percentage increase in the price (Rt) is larger the larger is a and P, and the smaller isf,+ . If the path with increased risk ever approached the other path from above, it would have a larger os and P1 and a smaller ft+,. Hence its percentage rate of increase in the next period would be higher, and the paths would never cross.
17 As a noted market analyst observed, these reports "were instrumental in changing investors' attitudes to the gold market" (Samuel Montagu & Co., Ltd. 1974, p. 6).
IV. The Consequences of Market Anticipations of Alternative Government Policies
Up to now, the analysis has focused on the implications of market anticipations of a particular type of government gold policy, a single auction. In this section, the effects of market anticipations of three alternative gold policies are considered: a sequence of auctions, a price ceiling, and a pegged price. It is worth considering the consequences of market anticipations of these alternative government policies for two reasons. First, since analysis of these cases involves the same methodology as that used in analyzing the case of anticipations of the announcement of a single auction, the general applicability of the approach is illustrated. ' 8 Second, it is conceivable that at some point in the future market participants might be given some reason to anticipate a government gold policy other than an auction. In addition, any analysis of the effects of anticipations of a policy requires a description of the effects of that policy when it is actually announced. Such a description provides a basis for understanding what happened in the gold market when the same policy or a similar policy was pursued in the past even if it had not been anticipated.
The approach used to analyze the effects of anticipations of each of the three alternative policies is essentially the same as that utilized in Sections II and III. In each case the first step in the analysis is to determine the initial price on the path which emerges if an announcement is actually made in any period that the government will undertake a particular action. It is shown for each policy how this price depends on the size of the private stock at the time of the announcement. In each case the time path of all variables could then be computed by replacing equation (3) with this new relationship, retaining the other equations of the model, and utilizing a backward solution as in Section II. For the three policies considered, the properties of the price path in anticipation of the policy announcement are described as they were in Section III for the case of a single auction.
To begin, consider the consequences of market anticipations of an announcement by the government that it will conduct two auctions at which Go and G, will be sold, respectively, where G0 + G, = C. Suppose it is known that the first auction will take place at the time of the announcement and that the second will take place k + 1 periods later. For any given private stock, the post-announcement price path will not depend on how the fixed total stock (C) is allocated between the two separate auctions provided one condition is met. Assume first that the private stock is zero and let DD in figure 3, top, is reached the government will satisfy demand for some time at that price and that they will receive no capital gains during this time. Since private market participants have no incentive to hold gold in the absence of capital gains, they attempt to sell gold, and the price drops to the first price on HI. The rest of the price path is IJK which is a lateral translation of EFG. For a while the government satisfies demand from its stock; then there is a speculative attack in which private market participants buy up the rest 21 It is assumed in the text that the stock the government is willing to sell to defend the ceiling exceeds the cumulative demand along a price path beginning at the specified ceiling price and rising to the choke price at the rate of interest. Suppose, instead, that the government reserves were smaller:
X=O
In that case, the post-announcement price path would have no flat segment, and the initial price on that path would be determined by eq. (3). The price path in anticipation of an announcement that the government will defend a ceiling would then be indistinguishable from the price path in anticipation of an auction. 22 Actually, the market price which prevails in the period in which the attack occurs may be anywhere in the closed interval between andf( 1 + r). Of course, if the market price lies above, those lucky enough to be able to purchase gold from the government make an immediate capital gain. 23 The analysis implies that selling gold at a fixed real price results in a speculative attack. Of course, selling at a declining real price (or, equivalently, at a fixed nominal price in an inflationary world) makes the inevitable occur more quickly. of the government stock. The larger the initial private stock, the lower the first price on the post-announcement price path,f,, and the longer the time between the announcement and the timefis reached.24 Afterfis reached the price path is the same no matter what the size of the private stock at the time of the announcement since only the government stock remains. Hence, by announcing that it is willing to defend a ceiling the government determines how much it will receive for its gold, but the timing of the required government sales and, therefore, the present value of the proceeds, is determined endogenously.
The properties of the price path which emerges in anticipation of an announced ceiling can now be summarized. At termination, when the private stock is zero, PT > fT since PC > j. Using this condition, it can be demonstrated by repeating the proofs of Section III that in each period the price which emerges in the absence of an announcement is greater than the price which emerges if an announcement is made; that the first price on the post-announcement price path rises at less than the rate of interest; that the path of prices which emerges in the absence of an announcement rises at a rate greater than the rate of interest; and that this rate of increase itself increases over time. In short, the price path which emerges in anticipation of an announcement that a ceiling will be defended has properties similar to the corresponding price path when the event anticipated is an announcement of an auction.
Finally, consider the consequences of an announcement by the government that it will attempt to peg the gold price at a fixed real value, ? by buying whatever gold is offered to it or by selling at that price whatever it has acquired plus its initial inventory of G. realize that the government can sustain f for a time and that they will receive no capital gains during this time. Since both speculators and zerocost extractors are unwilling to hold gold when they earn no capital gains, they immediately sell their entire stocks to the government at f. 26 The government alone then supplies gold to consumers at f for some time as shown by LO. Eventually, however, the augmented government stock is depleted to the point that it can be exhausted along OP, which is a lateral translation of MN, and the rest of the government gold is purchased in a 26 With increasing marginal extraction costs, each mine extracts more gradually and sells to the government over time. Initially, extraction proceeds at a declining rate so that marginal profit (the fixed government buying price less marginal cost) rises at the rate of interest. During this phase, consumers buy gold either directly from mines or else from the government. Eventually, however, the remaining government gold stock begins to be worth more than the price charged by the government. At that moment, the entire government stock is purchased in a speculative attack. It can be shown that speculators and extractors then coexist in the market for some period of time with both supplying bullion to consumers. Finally, however, the speculators exhaust their supplies, and the mines alone supply consumers until demand is choked off.
